Nowadays, security attacks on cyber physical systems have been reported frequently, wherein the eavesdropping attack is an usual hidden type of passive attack. In this paper, we consider the resilience of a discrete-time networked system in the presence of eavesdropping attacks. First, we analyze the convergence properties of the networked system. Then we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the eavesdropper can infer the states of the networked system by observing the states of partial of nodes, and also provide necessary conditions when the network has some nodes with zero out-degree. Finally, we verify all the derived theoretical results by numerical simulations, and show the relation of the node role in the network and the eavesdropping performance in some typical networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of Cyber-physical systems(CPS) applied in industrial processes, the security issue of its communication layer has attracted much more attention from diverse areas, and much more network attack events have been reported, including false data injection, eavesdropping, or DoS attacks, etc. Nowadays, the attackers usually launch coordinated intelligent attacks, i.e., they can not only adopt multiple attacking methods but also carry out data learning. As the basis of deploying the complicated attacks, the attacker needs to gather the information of the considered system, which could be completed by the eavesdropping attacks. For a CPS, the leakage of some 'key' information could assist in completing other attacks and even cause serious consequences. The current CPS is generally equipped with the safe defense system. However, more and more sensing and communication layer of CPS adopt distributed structure, which leads to higher probability of accessibility of the intruder. From the perspective of the attacker, it is important to know those necessary units or subsystems whose information required to gathered in order to infer the global information of the entire system. From the view of the system, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Aniello Castiglione .
it is necessary to know those key units and subsystems as well, which can help us strengthen the protection measure against hostile attacks.
Over past decades, there have been many researches directed to the defense measure against malicious attacks [1] - [6] . According to the attack methods, the existing works can be generally classified into eavesdropping attack [7] , [8] , data integrity attack [9] , [10] , and Denial of Service(DoS) attack [11] - [15] . Specifically, most of works adopt encryption mechanism [16] - [18] to protect the data privacy. For example, Wang et al. [19] proposed a vulnerability assessment method based on attack graph and maximum traffic for attacks in industrial IoT. Xie et al. [20] proposed a security problem based on an unobservable attack of an incomplete system matrix. Mo and Murray [21] proposed a method to add a noise signal that meets specific requirements in the process of unification. Pequito et al. [22] used the knowledge of system model theory to study the situation where the state information of the node leaked to the non-neighbor node.
In this paper, we mainly consider the information leaks of a networked system in the presence of an eavesdropper who can observe the states of a partial of nodes in the system. In the later discussion, we will show that the analysis of observing global information for the proposed eavesdropping model is related to the observability of traditional linear systems.
Till now, there have been extensive studies on the observability of high-dimensional linear systems [23] - [27] . In view of the dual nature of controllability and observability, one can refer to the research on the controllability of complex networks. Ruths and Ruths [28] , [29] proposed a topology-based control flow link in the network, analyzed the transmission path of information in the network, and linked the structural controllability with the network controllability. Reference [28] also proved that the topology of complex networks is also closely related to information security issues.
In this paper, we use the traditional methods of observability analysis in linear system theory to analyze the global information gathering for the attacker observing limited system states. Different from the existing works, we aim to find those 'key' nodes required to be monitored by the attacker with the goal of inferring the states of the entire system. It can help us adopt effective defensive measures to protect those 'key' nodes against the complicated attacks as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we mainly introduce the model of the networked system and the eavesdropping model. In Section III, we analyze the convergence of the networked system, and investigate the condition that the eavesdropper can observe the whole networked system completely and study the role of some special nodes in several typical networks. Finally, some numerical examples are provided to verify the main theoretical results in Section IV, and concluding results are provided in Section V.
Notations: Let R n and C n be the vector space of real and complex n-vectors, R n×m and C n×m be the set of n × m real and complex matrices. Let I n be the identity matrix of size n, 1 n be the vector with all coefficients one. Let diag(a 1 , . . . , a n ) be the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements a 1 , . . . , a n . Let σ (A) be the set of all the eigenvalues of matrix A, and ρ(A) be the spectral radius of the matrix A, and A ∞ be the infinite norm of matrix A. Let A ⊗ B be the Kronecker product of matrices A and B. Let card(A) be the cardinality of the set A.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a directed network represented by a graph G = (V , E), where V is the set of nodes of G and E is the set of edges of G. An edge (i, j) is directed from j to i, where i is the tail and j is the head of the edge. Define the sets of neighbours, in-neighbours and out-neighbours of node i by
where the in-degree and out-degree of node i are card(N in (i)) and card(N out (i)), respectively.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a networked system with the state update equation of each node as where x i (k) ∈ R n is the state vector, and is a positive constant weight.
The adjacency matrix L of the graph is defined as
with L ii = 0 for all i. Thus, we can use Kronecker product to represent the state of the entire network. Let
) T be the state vector of the whole networked system. Then the whole system can be rewritten in compact form as
C. EAVESDROPPER MODEL
In real applications, the network evolves towards huge scale and open access, which causes potential risks of information leakage. For a networked system, the eavesdropper is much easier to access the communication channel to gather the transmitted data. Meanwhile, it is impractical to intercept all the transmitted data due to the constrained capability of the eavesdropper and huge scale of the networked system. In this paper, we consider that an eavesdropper can measure the states of a partial of nodes in the network, and then use these obtained information to infer the initial state of the whole networked system. It is worth mentioning that if the eavesdropper can deduce the initial state of the whole networked system, then it can infer the state of the whole networked system at any time. In Fig. 1 , if the eavesdropper can observe the state of node 3, then we say the eavesdropper can monitor node 3 and obtain information about node 3.
In the existing security literatures, as far as we know, few research works have been devoted to the study of estimating all the global information by observing partial of information of networked system. Some related works can refer to the network observability issue [20] , [24] , [25] .
Let δ i = 1 if the eavesdropper can observe the state of node i. For examples, in Fig.1 , we say that the eavesdropper can monitor node 3, i.e., δ 3 = 1. Let = diag(δ 1 , . . . , δ N ) ∈ R N ×N denote the eavesdropping matrix. Define
where s i (k) ∈ R n is the state of node i observed by the eavesdropper at time step k, and ∈ R m×n denotes the observation matrix of the eavesdropper.
Let
. . , s T N (k)) T be the observed states of the whole networked system. We further integrates the observed states of all the nodes as
First, we introduce a lemma that will be used in the following analysis.
Lemma 1 [30] : A discrete-time system is observable if for any initial state x 0 and some final time k, the initial state x 0 can be uniquely determined by knowledge of the output y i for
In view of the eavesdropping model, the following definition plays a vital role in our further analysis.
Definition 1: For system (1) and (4), if x i (k) can be derived from s i (k), s i (k + 1), . . . , s i (k + n − 1) for any k, we say that node i can be completely observed by the eavesdropper, i.e., node i is observable. For system (3) and (5), if X (k) can be derived from S(k), S(k + 1), . . . , S(k + n − 1) for any k, we say that the networked system can be completely observed by the eavesdropper, i.e., the networked system is observable.
In this paper, we try to find the conditions under which the eavesdropper can infer the initial state of the networked system (3). In fact, this problem is equivalent to examining the observability of the networked system.
Remark 1: As we all know, in linear system theory, if the measurement equation for node i with dynamics (1) is y i (k) = Cx i (k), node i is observable if its initial state could be uniquely determined from the measurements within finite time, i.e., (A, C) is said to be observable. Actually, the considered problem in this paper aims to find the conditions that the eavesdropper can infer the states of the whole networked system by observing a partial of nodes, which is similar to find the conditions for the structure observability. Interestingly, the condition that all the nodes are observable is not equivalent to the condition that the whole networked system is observable. The result is contrary to the intuition, which motivates us to explore the relationship between the observability of single node and one of the whole networked system.
III. MAIN RESULT A. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
Before investigating the observability conditions, we firstly analyze the convergence of the networked system (3).
Lemma 2 [31] : As for a discrete constant system X (k + 1) = AX (k), k 0, the sufficient condition for lim k→∞ X (k) to converge is ρ(A) < 1.
Lemma 3 [31] : As for a matrix A ∈ C n×m , there must be ρ(A)
A ∞ , where A ∞ = max 1 i n n j=1 a ij denotes the sum of the row elements of matrix A. Lemma 4 [32] : As for a model F(k + 1) = PF(k), k 0, where p ij 0 and k j=1 p ij = 1, the infinite state lim k→∞ F(k) will converge as consensus or clusters. Define
where [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ] T = A1 n , and
where d j = card(N in (j)). Theorem 1: The system state (3) converges to a steady-
Proof: It is easy to get that the sum of elements in ith row of jth block of the system matrix
is a i + N k=1 L kj , that is, a i + d j .
According to Lemma 2-4, the networked system converge to a steady-state if
where 1 i n, 1 j N . Therefore, we consider limiting the the max sum of row elements. In view of
we have
which completes the proof.
B. OBSERVABLE CONDITIONS
To obtain the main results, we need the following Lemma. 
Using all the above arguments, we can obtain the following results.
Theorem 2: The following statements are equivalent. 1) The networked system (3)-(5) can be completely observed by the eavesdropper; 2) For any complex numbers, the matrix solution F ∈ C n×N of both equations (sI n − A)F = FL T and F T = 0 is F = 0. Proof: According to Remark 2, we can obtain that the networked system (3) 
The networked system (3)- (5) is observable if is of full column rank.
Then is of full column rank if and only if the solution for the following equations
is
Denote F = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N ) ∈ C n×N andP = (η 1 , . . . , η N ) ∈ C n×N , then (15) can be transformed to
That is, the solution for the following equations
is F = 0. Then the proof is completed.
Remark 3:
In Theorem 2, sufficient and necessary condition is obtained to infer the initial state of the networked system in the case when the eavesdropper can only observe a small number of nodes. The condition explores the relation of system parameters, network topology, and the selection of nodes observed by the eavesdropper.
Obviously, the choice of eavesdropping matrix is key for obtaining the state of the entire system. In the following, we further investigate the role of nodes in the network and its influence on the observability of the networked system. Theorem 3: If there exists a node i with V in = {i|N out (i) = ∅} in the network, then the necessary conditions for observing the whole networked system completely are as follows, 1) (A, ) is observable,
Proof: It is easy to get that if node i has no outneighbours, the ith block column of
is (0, . . . , 0, sI − A, 0, . . . , 0, δ i , 0, . . . , 0) T .
First, if the node i is not monitored by the eavesdropper, i.e., δ i = 0, then for any s 0 ∈ σ (A), the column rank will be reduced.
Second, if (A, ) is unobservable, then there exists an s 0 ∈ σ (A), resulting in the reduction of the rank. The proof is completed.
Remark 4: Obviously, the above results satisfy with the intuition. If the nodes does not send information to other nodes, the eavesdropper cannot infer the information of this node from any other node. Therefore, the nodes without outneighbours must be monitored by the eavesdropper.
In addition, for the networked system with specific topologies, we can directly determine which nodes are required to be observed by the eavesdropper. According to Theorem 3, we can further obtain the following result.
Corollary 1: In order to determine the state information of the entire networked system, there are many nodes that should be monitored in typical structures. When the network topology is a chain, the eavesdropper only needs to monitor the nodes which does not send information out. When the network topology is a circle, the eavesdropper only needs to monitor any one node in the circle. When the network topology is a star, the eavesdropper needs to monitor all the nodes except the center node. When the network topology is a tree, the eavesdropper needs to monitor all the leaf-nodes.
Proof: It follows directly from Theorem 3.
IV. SIMULATION

A. CONVERGENCE
First, we consider two networked systems consisting of 6 nodes. Both systems have the same node system dynamics and different network topologies. 
According to Theorem 1, we can obtain that the networked system in Example 1 converge to a steady-state if 0 < 0.05 because a max = 0.9 and d max = 2. Thus, when = 0.04 as shown in Fig.3(a) , the states of the whole networked system converge to 0, and when = 0.11 as shown in Fig.3(c) , the states of the whole networked system diverge. It is worth mentioning that when = 0.07 as shown in Fig.3(b 
According to Theorem 1, we obtain that the networked system in Example 2 converges when 0 < 0.05 because a max = 0.9 and d max = 2. Actually, as for the subnetwork consisting of node 5 and node 6, it converges when 0 < 0.1 because d 5 = d 6 = 1. Obviously, although the topology of the subnetwork consisting of node 1, 2, 3, 4 is asymmetrical, the in-degree of each node is 2, when = 0.05 as shown in Fig.4(a) , the sum of row elements of this subnetwork is equal to 1, then these 4 nodes can reach consensus. However, when = 0.06 as shown in Fig.4(b) , it diverges. 
B. OBSERVABILITY OF EAVESDROPPER
In view of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, we consider the observability of eavesdropper in the network with typical structures.
Example 3: Consider a link network consisting of 4 identical nodes with dynamics (1), see Fig.5(a) 
and
Obviously, it can be derived from the above formula that the only solution is F = 0. We can calculate rank(Ã, ϒ) = 8 when δ 1 = 1. Moreover, when the eavesdropper monitors any one node on this circle, we can obtain the same conclusion. We consider a standard binary tree as a combination of a link structure and a two-node star structure. Therefore, the eavesdropper needs to monitor node 4 in the link structure and node 3 on the remaining star branches. By calculations, the eavesdropper can get the information of the whole network as long as monitoring the nodes including node 3 and node 4. However, if one of those nodes is not monitored, the states of the whole network cannot be observed completely. In this case, the eavesdropper must monitor all the leaf-nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the resilience of discrete linear time-invariant systems under eavesdropping attacks. We have provided a sufficient condition for the stability of the networked system, and then established a necessary and sufficient condition for inferring the states of the networked system completely by observing the states of partial of nodes by the eavesdropper.We have also proved that the conditions that the observability of (A, ) and monitoring those nodes with zero out-degree is necessary for observing the states of the whole networked system completely. With the aid of numerical simulations, we have verified all the derived theoretical results, and explored the role of some special nodes on the observability of the whole networked system with some typical network structures. In the future, we will examine the possible eavesdropper model in a more practical scenarios.
